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Abstract 
Theoretical and historical experience suggests a financial centre may either include a single, 
consolidated and loosely regulated stock exchange attracting all intermediaries and actors, or 
a variety of exchanges going from strictly regulated to completely unregulated and adapted to 
the needs of different categories of intermediaries, investors and issuers. Choosing between 
these two solutions is uneasy because few substantial changes occur at this “meta-regulatory” 
level. The history of the Paris exchanges provides a good example, since two changes in 
opposite directions occurred in the late 19th century, when Paris was the second financial 
centre in the world. In 1893, a law threatened the existing two-exchanges equilibrium by 
diminishing the advantages of the more regulated exchange; in 1898, another law brought 
them back. We analyse the impact of these two changes on the competition between the 
exchanges in terms of securities listed, traded volumes and spreads. We conclude competition 
among exchanges is a delicate matter and efficiency is not always where one would think. 
 
JEL codes:  G14 G18 G24 N13 N23 N43 
Keywords : Paris stock exchange, microstructures, reforms, regulation, monopoly, spreads
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comments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The debate on the virtues of fragmentation vs consolidation of securities markets has 
recently been reopened by the Mifid directive of the European Union and its revision. In some 
European countries, like Italy and France, regulated markets were protected against internal 
competition by rules imposing the concentration of orders on listed securities, even if they 
competed with other international markets. The implementation of Mifid on November 1st, 
2007 allowed the entry of new competitors in the stock exchange industry: MTF, systematic 
internalizers, crossing networks, dark pools. This was well in line with the idea dominating 
Mifid that the contestability of the market would allow both a substantial decrease of 
transaction costs and an important increase in transparency, when also stimulating the 
integration of the European securities market.  
Nevertheless, the effects of Mifid as observed two years later don’t correspond 
entirely with the Commission’s expectations. The complex nature of transaction costs on 
stock exchanges – indirect costs related to multidimensional liquidity (tightness, deepness, 
immediacy) and information in particular – make them difficult to evaluate, and suggest the 
association of deregulation and the decrease of costs may be less obvious than previously 
considered. 
The literature on the microstructures of securities markets often emphasized the 
benefits of a consolidated market for both investors and issuers, considering such a 
consolidation as the natural consequence of the competition between markets. The benefits of 
consolidation result from positive externalities of liquidity, from the diversification of risks 
and investment opportunities, and the reduction in information asymmetries resulting from the 
consolidation of the price discovery process. The organization of securities exchanges 
involving important fixed costs, the consolidation in one market, together with the 
competition among brokers, is supposed to decrease transaction costs.  
Following the bonding hypothesis, investors and issuers should concentrate on a 
unique highly transparent market with strict listing and disclosure requirements.  For issuers, 
this solution allows sending a signal on the quality of their governance. It protects uninformed 
investors against those better informed and screaming the market. Even informed investors 
would prefer concentrating on a market with the high liquidity resulting from the presence of 
uninformed investors (Coffee 2002). 
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In the opposite direction, a more recent literature emphasizes the obstacles to such a 
consolidation, and the advantages of a fragmented market if investors and issuers are 
heterogeneous enough in terms of risk aversion, information, costs structure and patience. For 
example, informed investors (and the CEOs of some firms) may prefer an opaque market 
where they can take advantage of their superior information, when uninformed investors may 
opt for a transparent and less immediate market; a variety of markets may emerge, where 
different categories of actors could find the characteristics they prefer (e.g. Seppi 1997). In 
terms of the bonding hypothesis, fragmentation may also result from the capacity constraints 
that a highly transparent market with strict listing conditions would face. Such a market must 
restrict access to a select group of brokers in order to limit counterparty risk, something which 
reduces the number of available counterparties and limits the market’s capacity to treat a high 
number of transactions. Such a market must select firms on strict criteria, something which, 
especially during new technology booms, may restrict the access of emerging firms which 
will search for another market for their shares (Coffee 2002).  
Hence, if there is a consensus on the inefficiencies that would result from the 
juxtaposition of various identical markets, serious arguments suggest that the co-existence of 
different markets may help the development of the securities market as a whole. In 
equilibrium, the transaction costs in such markets would differ profoundly in their structure. If 
one considers transaction costs as including not only commissions but also liquidity and 
uncertainty, one would expect commissions to be lower, liquidity to be higher and uncertainty 
to be larger in less regulated markets. Among the various dimensions of liquidity, immediacy 
would be the dominant one in such a market thanks to the presence of large informed traders 
aiming at taking profit from their information in a relatively opaque market (Pagano and Roell 
1996); on the other hand, relatively high spreads could result from inventory costs and, 
mainly, from the risks intermediaries face when trading with highly informed agents (Stoll 
1989, Hasbrouck 1988, Madhavan and Smith 1991). In order to manage uncertainty, a 
regulated market could reduce risks by both its organizational structure (i.e. efficient 
settlement and delivery) and the guarantees it offers (i.e. central counterpart) (Duffy and Zhu 
2009, Bernanke 1990 and Kroszner (1999, 2006).  
 
Recent research on the history of stock exchanges confirmed that some financial 
centres could develop successfully not only when, as London, they included a single, open, 
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stock exchange, but also when, as New-York and Paris, they included various exchanges 
(White, 2008; Hautcoeur and Riva, 2009). From the early 19th c. onwards, the structure of the 
Parisian stock market was bipolar, including two very different markets, the Parquet and the 
Coulisse. The Parquet was the official market organized by the Compagnie des agents de 
change (CAC), the semi-private body of 60 official brokers (agents de change) with a legal 
monopoly on transactions. These brokers were recruited on strict social and wealth conditions 
which provided high guarantees to the investors (see Hautcoeur and Riva 2009 for an estimate 
of these guarantees). The official market was highly transparent, imposed strict listing 
conditions, and provided investors with a collective guarantee which made losses unlikely in 
the case of the default of a member. It controlled strictly its members3. It also provided 
efficient payment and settlement mechanisms in cooperation with the Bank of France. 
By contrast, the Coulisse was a loosely organized market (with no juridical structure until 
1884), illegal de jure but de facto tolerated and even protected by the government. Its 
members acted both as brokers and jobbers. They were usually less wealthy than the official 
brokers. Their number was not fixed, and the admission procedure was loose. The Coulisse 
was opaque: orders were not centralised, transaction prices were registered unsystematically, 
and published by newspapers without any guarantee for investors, in variable lists. 
Competition among coulissiers was not regulated and transactions were only guaranteed by 
their capital and individual wealth that on average was lower than the agents de change’ one4. 
The differences between the two markets led to a specialization, competition 
developing only at the margin. The coulisse mostly dealt in forward and option operations, 
when the Parquet had a de facto quasi-monopoly on spot transactions. The Coulisse listed 
many (mostly foreign) issuers that did not satisfy the listing requirements of the Parquet 
(including some fiscal requirements). Competition between the two markets concerned mostly 
the most liquid, hence cross-listed, foreign and French government bonds, those on which 
                                                 
3  On the counterparty risk management by the Parquet, see Riva-White 2009. 
4  We have no data on the personal wealth of the coulissiers, but historical research shows that they 
belong to a social class lower than the Agents de change (Verley 2007 and 2010, forthcoming). Concerning 
the firms’ capital, we have detailed data on the Agents de changes’ one, but not on the coulissiers’ “houses”. 
The patente (a tax on the value of commercial real estates owned by merchants) is the best available proxy 
for comparing the two groups: on average, an agent de change paid five times the amount paid by a 
coulissiers in 1893 (Administration des contributions directes. Département de la Seine.  Rapport du 
Directeur, Paris le 3/1/1893. Tab. N° 1 Contribution des patentes - Agents de change, 4/1/1893 et Tab. N° 2 
Contribution des patentes - Tenant caisse ou comptoir d'opérations sur valeurs, 4/1/1893. box B 33.236 
CAEF). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the total amount paid by the coulissiers was equal to the one 
paid by the agents de change. 
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most of the speculative activity was concentrated (Vidal 1904)5; from 1890 on, it also 
involved a number of mid-cap French firms listed on the two exchanges. Individual investors 
mostly sent their orders to the Parquet, when professional investors split their orders between 
the two markets. 
This bipolar architecture remained quite steady over the century, suffering only one 
severe threat in the late 1850s, when the Parquet attempted (and failed) taking over the 
Coulisse. In the following decades, the Coulisse developed steadily. In the 1890s, the bipolar 
architecture was discussed and tested, the Paris market becoming the place for two 
experiments in microstructures that are the subject of this paper. In 1893, the creation of a 
new tax gave to the Coulisse a legal status, de facto dismantling the monopoly of the Parquet 
and creating an open field for new entrants in the exchange business. In 1898, a new (tax) law 
took the opposite route and re-established the monopoly of official brokers on all transactions 
in the securities they listed.  
We first present an historical account of the suppression and reestablishment of the 
Parquet’s monopoly, presenting the different arguments that were used and the main reasons 
one can propose in order to understand these two important changes. We then try to assess 
their impact on the market by looking first at quantities traded and at the two markets’ quality 
as measured by the spreads on listed securities. 
 
2. History 
 
The 1893 reform 
In 1892, a tax on stock market transactions was proposed by the socialist member of 
the Chamber of Deputies Antoine Jourde not only as a sanction for the various financial crises 
and scandals of the previous decade (among which the Panama canal corruption scandal led to 
the resignation of the finance minister on December 13th 1892, just one day after Jourde’s 
proposal was approved by the Chamber), but also as a statistical instrument allowing the 
government to observe the operations on the stock market (see his speech at the Parliament on 
                                                 
5  During the XIX century, speculative activity concentrated on large international issues of public bonds 
cross-listed on the main European exchanges, not on stocks. Vidal (1904) explains that speculators dealt on 
this kind of securities because (i) the issues were very large; (ii) the probability of default was limited 
relatively to other securities; (iii) coupons insured stable and foreseeable revenues; (iv) prices’ variations 
were not correlated to either local or seasonal factors.  
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Dec. 13th, 1895 and the introduction to the bill6).  
The Coulisse and the Parquet brokers fought against the tax that would in their vision 
harm Paris as international financial centre. Nevertheless, each group rapidly turned to 
consider the tax as an opportunity for obtaining a favourable settlement in the conflict that 
opposed them: “they differed only on the application process, which, for both of them, was 
crucial”7. The tax created a dilemma for the government because of the structure of the Paris 
stock market: if it was to be imposed only to the Parquet, it would kill it, since all operations 
would migrate to the tax exempted Coulisse; but if imposed to the Coulisse too on equal 
bases, it would legalize it, and badly damage the Parquet which would suffer from its heavier 
regulatory burden without the advantage of a superior legal position. Nevertheless, the 
interactions among professional groups and regulators helped the latter to solve the dilemma.  
The Finance Minister Pierre Tirard presented a bill in January which reinforced the 
official brokers' monopoly, since it made their signature necessary for the payment of the tax 
on listed securities. In fact, the Parquet had started lobbying the government very soon. 
Berteaux, an important official broker and member of the Parquet’s Committee (the Chambre 
Syndicale) with influential political connections (he became a Member of Parliament in 1893 
and Minister some years later8), met Jean Casimir-Perier9 and the Minister of Finance and 
was happy of their good will towards the Parquet10. Nevertheless, the Chambre syndicale 
prepared its arguments for the debate with the paradoxical support of two liberals Edmond 
Théry and Paul Delombre who would be the main advisors of the Agents de change during 
the entire episode11.  
The argument was first a purely legal one: as Crépon, a judge at the Cour de cassation 
                                                 
6   « La lumière pénétrera du même coup dans un monde spécial, extérieur à notre marché officiel, et où les 
intérêts et l’élément français ne figurent qu’en minorité » (Exposé des motifs, Impôt sur les opérations de 
bourse, January, 1893, box B 64.877, CAEF).   
7 Y. Guyot, « L’impôt sur les opérations de Bourse », Le Siècle, Feb. 7th 1893. 
8  Berteaux entered the Chambre thanks to the renewal following the scandal of Panama which obliged many 
of politicians to retire. He belonged the radical-socialist party and was many times Minister of War, after 
being President of the Budget Commission.  
9  When Berteaux met the long lasting politician Jean Casimir-Perier, the latter was president of the budget 
commission of the Chambre, but some days later (on January 10), he became President of the Chambre. In 
1894 he became President of the Republic.  
10   “Dispositions bienveillantes” (Minutes of the Chambre Syndicale January 6, 1893). 
11  The first one was an influential economist and journalist, director of the Economist Européen, the main 
French economic newspaper. Delombre, a member of Parliament since September 1893 (Union 
démocratique and then républicain progresiste), was a brilliant lawyer in charge of the economic column of 
the important newspaper Le Temps. He would become Minister of Trade and Industry from 1/11/1898 to 
18/2/1899. He was a member of the liberal Société d’Economique Politique de Paris. See the Minutes of the 
Chambre Syndicale January 20th, 1893. 
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(the highest judiciary level in France), wrote, it was impossible to tax the operations of the 
coulissiers since they were illegal (both the operations and the coulissiers). Nevertheless, even 
judges knew the Coulisse had a major role in securities transactions, and Crépon asked for a 
reform that would clearly define the Parquet as the centre of the market, but recognizing some 
role for the Coulisse12. The Parquet apparently had convinced the government that it provided 
a necessary protection to individual investors, frequently unfavourably treated by the Coulisse 
and victims of the 1880s scandals. They also argued that the transparency of the Parquet was 
beneficial to listed firms (its price discovery process would insure a fair valorisation of their 
stocks), something also emphasized by the leading employers’ union13. The restrictive law on 
corporations passed on August 2nd, 1893 (and still debated in early 1894) had revealed the 
Government desire of better controlling the financial market after the banks’ scandals of 1889 
and 1890 and the Panama affair. The official brokers argued that imposing a subsidiary 
position to the Coulisse would not affect the market as badly as the coulissiers pretended: 
first, the Parquet would provide, thanks to increased transactions, more efficient services and 
better immediacy; second, the Coulisse would not disappear, but only adapt to its subsidiary 
status and stop the illicit (because on Parquet’s securities) part of its operations14. It would 
continue providing brokerage services but not market making on Parquet’s securities: the 
coulissiers would switch from jobbers to speculators placing orders on the Parquet’s book. 
Actually, the Parquet officially offered the coulissiers high rebates on their commissions for 
the business they would bring to the official brokers15. The presentation of the bill went as far 
as promising a reorganization of the whole market, which would give some recognition to the 
Coulisse. 
The coulissiers refused, maybe because – as the Parquet argued – most of their 
business came from acting as counterparties on listed securities. Losing their immediacy 
                                                 
12  La Coulisse « est nécessaire pour le développement (…) des transactions (…) auxquelles font obstacle les 
heures de bourse étroitement limitées et les responsabilités rigoureusement définies des agents de change » 
(Gazette des Tribunaux, March 24th, 1893). 
13  When audited by the Chambre commission, the chairman of the Association de l’Industrie Française 
declared favouring the Tirard bill because the price discovery mechanism on the Parquet allowed a better 
approximation of the « true value » of stocks, and because the Coulisse didn’t provide sufficient guarantees 
in terms of « regularity » and « nationality » (Impôt sur les opérations de bourse, Dépositions devant la 
Commission du Budget, Audition du Président de l’Association de l’Industrie Française, CAEF, B34.010). 
14   « Le parquet d’aujourd’hui, plus modéré que l’ancien, ne demande pas la mort du pêcheur ; encore voudrait-
il lui enlever des occasions de pêcher » [Anonymous « Le marché libre ; Quinze millions par an pour l’Etat »,  
1893. box B. 64.877, CAEF p. 1. 
15 Lettre rectificative (corrective letter) sent to M. E. Boulanger, Senator, by the Chambre syndicale des agents 
de change de Paris, March 21st 1893, p. 9; CAEF, box 64877..  
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because of the Tirard bill (since the agents de change would have to execute the transactions), 
they would lose most of their counterparty business16. They started an intense lobbying 
campaign, advised by Claude Clausel de Coussergues and Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau, famous 
financial lawyers and politicians17. They proposed a bill aiming at the buyback of the seats of 
the official brokers and at a general regulation of the profession of broker in exchange for the 
abolition of the official brokers and for the free entry in the profession18. They also pretended 
that submitting the Coulisse operations to the tax would bring 15 millions in taxes, which 
would otherwise be lost for the budget19. 
The budget commission of the Chamber of Deputies, of which the Coulisse’s advisor 
Claude Clausel de Coussergues was a member, auditioned the various interests and, under the 
influences of Felix Faure and Raymond Poincaré (two future Presidents), took a position 
hostile to the bill proposed by the government and favourable to the Coulisse. Officially, the 
commission argued that the government should not modify the status quo on the stock market 
– that is, impeaching the coulisse from doing what it was actually allowed to do for decades – 
without a law directly aiming at such a change. It added that the Parquet could still legally sue 
the Coulisse if considering it was breaking its monopoly20. It ended up creating a special sub-
commission which would prepare a different bill, one “which would not disturb the stock 
                                                 
16  This was also the interpretation of the Paris Chamber of commerce: « l’énorme majorité des transactions 
exécutés par le marché libre n’a souvent pour origine que des affaires entamées par les coulissiers sans contre 
partie trouvée d’avance (…) les affaires dites arrêtées ». Rapport présenté au nom de la commission n° 3 de 
la Chambre de commerce de Paris par M Hugot. Adopté et converti en délibération de la CCI dans sa 
séance du 15 mai1898, CAEF, box B.64895. 
17 Claude Clausel de Coussergues was a brilliant financial lawyer who became member of the Chambre (as 
Républicain) in 1889. President of the Commission on the Panama affaire and member of the Budget at the 
time of the discussion of the tax on stock exchange transactions, he was the rapporteur on the first draft of 
1893 law on corporations. In 1894, he became vice-president of the Chambre up to his death in 1896. Pierre 
Waldeck-Rousseau had been a member of the Parliament and Minister up to 1885 (Ferry government). He 
proposed the law passed in 1884 liberalizing the creation of unions, which benefitted the Coulisse (cf. infra). 
After the resignation of Ferry’s government, he took a break from politics and became one of the most 
important lawyers in Paris. Elected again in 1894, he was candidate for the Presidency of the Republic in 
1895, when Felix Faure won. Partisan of Dreyfus in the Affaire, he was the artifex of the Bloc Républicain 
and became minister as well as Prime Minister.  
18 « Projet de loi portant suppression avec indemnité du monopole des agents de change et réglementation de la 
profession de courtier en valeurs mobilières », avril 1893, CAEF, cart. B 64877, and in the same file various 
other documents coming from the Coulisse. The Union of stock exchange and banks employees also  lobbied 
against a bill potentially reducing employment at the coulisse brokers (letter by L. Strauss, the Union's 
chairman, to the Finance minister, February 10th 1893, CAEF B 64877. 
19  Anonymous « Le marché libre ; Quinze millions par an pour l’Etat » (“ The free market : 15 millions per 
year for the State”), 1893. box B. 64.877, CAEF p. 1 
20  A chief lobbyist for the coulisse, Y. Guyot, argued this would not occur because many official brokers had 
financial interests in some of the coulissiers : “des agents de change sont intéressés dans des maisons de 
coulisse, y compris le syndic” (“L’impôt sur les opérations de bourse”, Le Siècle, féb. 7th, 1893). 
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exchange”21.  
This attempt was short lived since the Minister threatened resigning if the bill was not 
passed. The bill was then passed on February 24th, 1893, at the Chamber of Deputies (by 436 
to 41). But the conflict went then to the Senate, where the rapporteur of the budget 
commission, Ernest Boulanger22, also favoured the Coulisse. He argued that the government 
project would disturb the stock market, in which the Coulisse made 75 billions of operations a 
year compared to the Parquet’s 35 billions23. Maybe more importantly even, he wrote that the 
Parquet could not replace the Coulisse for international financial operations, so that the 
trading would move to foreign markets if the Coulisse was to disappear24. The Senate then 
separated the tax from the general budget. A discussion with the Chamber of Deputies 
ensued25.  
The debate ended, after the fall of the government (on a different topic). The new 
Minister of Finances Peytral26 acted in favour of the Coulisse. This liberal needed the tax on 
stock exchange transactions in order to balance the budget27. He ended the debate by 
promising a law reforming the stock exchange industry.  Then, the law was passed: it allowed 
any intermediary to pay the new tax on any kind of securities.Therefore, it legalized the 
Coulisse and put it on an equal footing as the Parquet, de facto allowing it to trade even in 
securities listed on the Parquet.  
 
Reasons for the reform 
If one aims understanding the reasons for the 1893 reform, it is necessary to take some 
                                                 
21  La Gironde, Feb. 6th, 1893. 
22  A Republicain member of the Chambre, he was the head of the fiscal department of the Finance Ministry 
when elected in 1886. He was several times member and president of the Budget and Finances commissions 
and became Minister of the Colonies in the Casimir-Perier cabinet (Casimir-Perier took position in favour of 
the Coulisse in the 1893 debate within the budget commission). In 1893 he was also administrator of the 
Compagnie Général des Omnibus, which securities were traded on the Coulisse.  
 
23  The Parquet discussed these figures, arguing they were produced by the coulissiers without any proofs. See 
the Lettre rectificative (corrective letter) sent to M. E. Boulanger, Senator, by the Chambre syndicale des 
agents de change de Paris (the governing body of the Parquet), March 21st 1893, p. 9; CAEF, box 64877. 
24  E. Boulanger, « Rapport général sur le Budget au Sénat », pp. 160s. 
25  Details can be found in the Rapport de M. le Président du Tribunal de Commerce de Paris à MM. les 
Présidents et Juges des tribunaux de commerce de la Seine, May 14th, 1898. CAEF, box 64.895. 
26 A radical-socialiste, Peytral had been Vice president and president of the Budget Commission before being 
Minister. Some personal conflicts with Tirard could also explain his position vis à vis the project of the latter: 
Peytral had been Finance Minister just before Tirard and the latter had rejected every work in progress of his 
predecessor.  
27   Peytral had to support the consequences of a decrease in the tax on alcoholised drinks, which he actually 
originated (in order to decrease the importance of indirect taxation) 
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distance from the immediate debates and to take a broad perspective on the Paris stock 
market. The reasons for the reform can be organized in three groups: the role and efficiency 
of the Coulisse; the interests of the banks; and those of the State. 
The Coulisse had developed rapidly in the period before the law, and put the Parquet 
in a defensive position. Taking advantage of the 1884 law legalizing unions (a law proposed 
by the Coulisse’s advisor Waldeck-Rousseau), the Coulisse had organized as a union (which 
meant no solidarity among its members), which allowed it to organize more efficiently, 
particularly the settlement and delivery system, which had been run earlier on a bilateral 
basis.  
Various regulatory changes were responsible for much of these changes. First, the 
1882 crash had led in 1885 to the legalization of the forward market, which benefited more 
the Coulisse than the Parquet: not only because it mostly operated on the forward market, but 
also because the Parquet’s forward operations already benefited before the law from a quasi-
systematic enforcement by the courts (mainly because of both the Parquet collective 
guarantee to the forward market operators and its strict trading rules28), which were more 
reluctant towards the Coulisse. Second, an 1885 decision by the Cassation court also reduced 
the uncertainty that coulissiers faced, by stating that a coulissier was a valid broker for a trade 
in securities not listed on the Parquet29. From then on, a list of securities tradable outside the 
Parquet was published yearly: it included 202 securities in 189230. Third, the 1890 new legal 
regulation of the Parquet reinforced its security, but increased its regulatory burden and then 
decreased its competitiveness. 
The banks formed a group increasingly supportive of the Coulisse. First because part 
of the advantages of trading on the Parquet have been lost to them because of an unsuccessful 
strategic move of the official brokers: after the 1882 crash, which had led to 14 defaults 
among these brokers, the Parquet, after paying for all the losses as their internal rules 
guaranteed to their clients, had considered its internal controls as unable to prevent free-riding 
within the Parquet, and decided to pay only for the debts they were legally constrained to 
guarantee. This led some of their clients – mostly bankers – to lose money when two official 
brokers went bankrupt in the 1886 (Vuaflart) and 1888 (Bex), events that the coulissiers 
                                                 
28  See Lagneau – Riva (2010, forthcoming).  
29  This desision ended a long-lasting debate on the extent of the agents’ monopoly and limited it to the 
officially listed securities.  
30  Tableau des Valeurs négociables Hors-Parquet published every year by the Almanach Financier.  
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highlighted in their campaign31. This was maybe efficient in terms of the Parquet internal 
incentive system, but tarnished heavily its reputation, and made the banks increasingly 
favourable to the Coulisse. 
More importantly, the banks had common interests with the Coulisse32. The deposit 
banks provided the huge amounts of short-term credit that was required by the forward 
market33. The merchant banks were important clients of the Coulisse since they appreciated 
the immediacy it alone could provide, as well as the opaqueness that allowed them to take 
advantage of their superior information. All banks wanted the market to be liberalized since it 
would allow them to internalize many of their clients’ orders without risk34, and to use the 
intermediation of the coulissiers without any legal uncertainty35. This new architecture would 
have allowed banks to put the official brokers in competition with the coulissiers and to 
decrease the intermediation costs36. Thanks to the dual capacity, the coulissiers already 
proposed low commissions (25 to 50% of the legal maximum commissions on the Parquet), 
since their profits would mostly come from their operations as counterparty. The last reason 
for the interest of the banks to be in line with those of the Coulisse was their joint 
involvement in the primary market, in particular on foreign and SME’s securities that could 
not always be listed on the Parquet: the coulissiers could buy on their own account a large 
portions of the issue and then trade it on the market. The banks and the Coulisse then jointly 
argued that the liberalization of the market would stimulate the role of Paris as a financial 
                                                 
31  Anonymous « Le marché libre ; Quinze millions par an pour l’Etat » (“ The free market : 15 millions per 
year for the State”), 1893. CAEF, box B. 64.877. 
32  “L’agent de change rend moins de services aux banquiers que les coulissiers”,  Lettre rectificative 
(corrective letter) sent to M. E. Boulanger, Senator, by the Chambre syndicale des agents de change de Paris, 
March 21st 1893, p. 9; CAEF, box 64877. 
33  In 1892, a huge conflit oppose the Parquet and the Crédit Lyonnais, at this time the main French deposit 
bank, on the Bourse du Soir, the evening session of the Coulisse held in the Crédit Lyonnais’ hall. The Credit 
Lyonnais extracted valuable information from hosting this session and fought against the Parquet which was 
asking its closure. The Parquet, after enormous efforts, obtained the closure, disrupting the evening 
international order flows (cf. Riva 2007)  
34  Following contemporaries’ accounts, it seems that internalisation was a common practice of many banks 
before 1893. Nevertheless, in case of litigation, the client could ask for the agent de change’s receipt, and 
have the bank condemned and the contract declared null.  
35  In case of litigation, the coulissiers dealing on securities listed on the Parquet could be condemned because 
not entitled for handling such a transaction and the contract declared null, if the latter was unable to exhibit 
this receipt.  
36  Various of these arguments were discussed in the letter to Boulanger by the Parquet : Les banques 
« généralement bien informé[e]s, trouvent leur avantage à se procurer ou vendre rapidement un lot de valeurs 
à la Coulisse » (p. 10) ; « banquiers et sociétés de crédit ont un intérêt puissant à ce que la dualité de la 
coulisse et des agents de change persiste. Avec cette concurrence ils obtiennent les avantages particuliers des 
deux Marchés et ils craignent, naturellement, que ces avantages disparaissent avec la concurrence » (p. 11) ; 
letter sent to M. E. Boulanger, Senator, by the Chambre syndicale des agents de change de Paris (the 
governing body of the Parquet), March 21st 1893; CAEF, box 64877.  
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centre, when the reinforcement of the Parquet monopoly would destroy it. 
The last party interested in the debate was the State. Its interest had various 
dimensions. The fiscal dimension opened the debate and was certainly not negligible. 
Nevertheless, the impact of a given choice on stock market operations was not clear, so that 
the Coulisse argument was not very strong. The impact of a blow to the Coulisse on the 
trading of French rentes was a more serious preoccupation, since most of that trading was 
done on the Coulisse; a rentes conversion was considered for January 1894, which bankers 
and coulissiers pretended would fail if the Coulisse was weakened. The role of the Coulisse 
during the huge issues of rentes required in 1872-75 by the war indemnity paid to Germany 
was still in all minds. Precisely for this reason, the Finance Minister asked the agents de 
change for renouncing to sue the Coulisse as they planned after the 1893 bill passed.  
The diplomatic dimension was also underscored: the Coulisse was the main market for 
various foreign government bonds, which listing in Paris was important for foreign relations. 
In 1892, the Russian Finance Minister S. Witte, had protested because of the move of Russian 
bonds from the Coulisse to the Parquet. It was the consequence of a private settlement 
between the Parquet and the Coulisse done, under the Minister of Finances pressures, after the 
Parquet planned to sue the coulisse in 1892. Major new issues of Russian debts were under 
consideration. In the same fashion, bankers and coulissiers pointed out that, without an active 
Coulisse, German financiers would take the place of French ones in Middle East countries, 
whom sovereign debts were traded mainly in the Coulisse.  
Finally, the population certainly appreciated the creation of a tax on financial 
operations, and would likely prefer a more regulated market, dominated by the Parquet, 
compared to a more deregulated one, dominated by the Coulisse. Creating a tax was 
nevertheless certainly sufficient to obtain a speculation-bashing reputation37. 
 
The 1898 law 
The 1893 reform, a result of a number of partially conflictive tensions, was reversed as 
soon as 1898. Another fiscal law then included the Fleury-Ravarin amendment, which 
imposed that the tax on officially listed securities could only be paid by the agents de change. 
                                                 
37 In 1895, a member of the Parliament spoke of the 1893 law as being received with fervour by the public (« la 
li de 1893 est une de celles que le pays a accueillies avec le plus de ferveur parce qu'il a vu qu'on se décidait 
pour la première fois à frapper la spéculation », Henry Cochin, Chamber of Deputies, December 13th, 1895, 
Journal Officiel, p. 2919).  
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This arrangement forbade the Coulisse to trade in these securities except for an agreement 
with the Parquet.  
Such a drastic reversal resulted from various reasons. The first one is the gold mines 
crash of 1895, which affected mostly the Coulisse. Many observers considered the coulissiers 
had developed the market on gold mines shares very speculatively: most of the shares did not 
comply with neither French regulations nor the Parquet’s listing requirements, the market was 
opaque and the information on the firms was very limited. Nevertheless, thanks to a huge 
media campaign, hundreds of millions worth of securities had been sold to the general public, 
whose losses were enormous. Furthermore, the Parquet proposed to organize the selection and 
listing of the best of these foreign shares by creating a specific market. This proposal had 
been refused just before the crash38. In 1896, the Parquet transmitted to the Finance Minister a 
file detailing the losses that the gold mines’ crash had imposed to French savings.  
This crisis facilitated a campaign by the Parquet against foreign brokers and their 
unsecured markets39, which fell well in a period of populist and xenophobic attacks against 
the Jews and their international (worse: German) connections making them insufficiently 
loyal to the country40. The Coulisse was even accused of allowing speculative practices that 
created diplomatic tensions, as in the case of the bull campaign on the Italian government 
bonds in 189441.  
A second reason for modifying the law was the tax evasion by the coulissiers. The behaviour 
of one of them, who avoided paying the tax on 2575 operations representing 44 millions 
francs, was revealed in 1897 and provoked some scandal at the Chamber of Deputies, 
especially when the coulissier escaped the tax and penalty (totalling 2,786 millions) thanks to 
                                                 
38  The Parquet asked in 1895 the extension to foreign securities  of the limit (put by the law of August, 2nd, 
1893) on the nominal value of the shares in French companies (which applied to its list), in order to be able 
to list some foreign shares (including gold mines). It argued it would better protect investors if able to screen 
and list the best shares, provide a secured market and have taxes paid (letter “Le syndic des agents de change 
à M Le Président du conseil, Ministre des finances, Paris, le 1/4/1895 CAEF B33232). 
39 The Parquet had already used similar arguments in 1893, when it helped the publication of the list of the 
members of the Coulisse mentioning their nationality and that of their backers or partners: many were 
Germans. See La Réforme Economique, supplément, March 23d, 1893.  
40  The famous « J’accuse » article by Emile Zola in L’Aurore was published on January 13th, 1898, marking 
the height of the Dreyfus affair. 
41 The sudden rise of the price of the Italian government bonds in January of 1894 was attributed to a 
speculative operation coordinated by the Deutsche Bank with the help of Crédit lyonnais and German 
coulissiers. M. Jourde raised the point at the Chamber of Deputies and the government refused answering for 
diplomatic reasons. See articles in Les Débats, February 25th, 1894; « Diplomatie » in La Petite République, 
February 26th, 1894, « La rente italienne » in La Lanterne, February 22nd, 1894. « Les préoccupations de M. 
Jourde » La Liberté, February 25th, 1894. 
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a bankruptcy (apparently not an isolated case42), and when it appeared that any coulissier 
acting as counterparty could relatively easily escape the tax43.  
On the positive side, a major reason for re-establishing the Parquet's dominant position 
was its return to its traditional policy of guaranteeing collectively the losses of its clients. The 
short-lived « anti-free-rider » policy which had been adopted in 1883 was disputed as soon as 
1890, when Verneuil entered the Chambre syndicale, and strenghtened first when the Parquet 
faced the 1895 crash, second when Verneuil became syndic in 1896.  
 
The aftermaths of the 1898 law  
The 1898 law didn't bring the market back to its pre-1893 organization. First, the 
reaffirmation of the Parquet's dominance had a price: the Parquet had to reorganize strongly. 
To a large extent, this was less the price of a monopoly than the requirement for the changes 
necessary in order to be able to handle a substantially increased number of transactions: the 
Parquet itself calculated that about 5/7 of the 70 billions of Coulisse transactions concerned 
securities listed on the Parquet, which would then be negotiated by the Parquet after 1898. 
The number of agents de change was increased from 60 to 70 and the number of pits was 
doubled; the commissions were reduced so much that they became inferior to those in London 
and other foreign markets44; the procedures for payment and settlement were reinforced and 
accelerated. An extension of the stock exchange building (the Palais Brongniart) was to be 
                                                 
42 A report by the Chairman of the Paris Commercial Court mentions several « frauds which repression was 
hindered by the insolvency of the offenders » (« fraudes sont l'insolvabilité des délinquants ne permettait pas 
la répression », Rapport de M. le Président du Tribunal de commerce de la Paris à MM. Les Présidents et 
Juges des Tribunaux de commerce de la Seine, May 14th, 1898, CAEF, bow 64.895). 
43  The head of the tax administration in charge explained that the only possible verification depended on the 
matching of the records of two intermediaries having done an operation together, which made it easy to 
escape for those acting as counterparty (letter “Le Directeur de l’Enregistrement au Ministre des Finances. 
Note Impôt sur les opérations de bourse. Observation de M Krantz », July, 2nd, 1897 ; CAEF, B 34.010). 
44 That very low level resulted both from a decrease (by half) of the legal maximum commission, and from the 
usual practice of commissions representing only about half the legal maximum. These “usual commissions” 
were the minimum that the Parquet itself tried to impose to its members in order to avoid excessive 
competition. The Crédit lyonnais calculated in 1906 for its own use a comparison of commissions on the 
major European markets, which mentioned the lowest rates for the Parquet. The same fact was considered a 
good reason for raising the tax on securities transactions without threatening the Paris market by the tax 
administration in 1906 (see « Note du Mouvement général des fonds au cabinet du Ministre (bureau des 
travaux législatifs), october 13, 1906, CAEF box B.64.877). Even the Paris Chamber of commerce, certainly 
not favourable to the Parquet monopoly, considered the commissions as low compared to the responsabilities 
that the agents de change beared (malgré « le principe du monopole qui n'eut peut-être pas prévalu dans vos 
avis (….) il est même évident que dans certains cas ce nouveau tarif fixe ce courtage à un taux peu en rapport 
avec la responsabilité qu'assume l'Agent » , rapport présenté au nom de la commission n°3 de la Chambre de 
commerce de Paris par M. Hugot, adopté et converti en délibération de la Chambre de commerce dans sa 
séance du 11 mai 1898, p. 2; CAEF, box B. 64.895).  
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financed by the Parquet, as well as a new association for the defence of investors in foreign 
securities, on the British model. 
Furthermore, the collective guarantee of the Parquet was enshrined in the law. The Finance 
Minister had promised such a decree on the subject to the Chamber of Deputies on April 6th, 
1898. The Parquet opposed it because of the moral hazard it may involve if no official broker 
could become bankrupt because of such solidarity: the brokers could take risks without 
sanction, and the public would have no incentive to discriminate among brokers on the basis 
of bankruptcy risk45. After lengthy debates, a text aiming at both limiting the moral hazard 
and guaranteeing solidarity was adopted46. 
The Government also imposed trough moral suasion a radical reorganization of the Coulisse: 
conditions for the admission of new members as well as a set of formal trading rules were 
established, a list of admitted securities was printed daily from 1899, making the market more 
transparent, and various regulations imposed, making the Coulisse less different from the 
Parquet. A result of this stricter integration was the creation of a third market, the Free 
Market, more opaque and unregulated, which nevertheless remained marginal up to World 
War One. Some securities listed on the Parquet were also nominally traded in Brussels by 
former coulissiers who refused adhering to the new structure and delocalized their 
headquarters while maintained their activity in Paris.  
Since at that moment the Coulisse operations were largely concentrated on securities listed on 
the Parquet, the reform would have killed the Coulisse except for an arrangement with the 
Parquet allowing the coulissiers to trade in some of the officially listed securities under the 
authority of the Parquet, but without acting as direct counterparty. That modus vivendi was 
signed in 1901. It made provision for large rebates (up to 80%) on the agents’ commissions to 
be given to the coulissiers for the business they provided to the Parquet. In particular, the 
Coulisse de la rente (on French government bonds) was allowed to continue its operations 
without change. 
One may then consider that the 1898 reform increased very substantially the size of the 
Parquet, allowing for the transfer of a large proportion of the business previously done by the 
Coulisse, but not eliminating the Coulisse thanks to the modus vivendi. Even if less efficient 
                                                 
45 Letter from the Syndic to the Finance Minister, May, 17th, 1898; CAEF, box 64.895. 
46 Cf. another, undated, letter from the « Syndic au Ministre des Finances », accompanying the « Note remise 
par le syndic des agents de change, texte proposé en remplacement de l'amendement Viviani sur la solidarité, 
rédaction de M. Sabatier ». CAEF, box 64895. 
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on some dimensions, this new architecture conferred more stability47 to and does not affect 
the development of the Paris financial centre: it did maintain firmly its position of second 
larger world financial centre, a rank that could not be explained by the French real economy.  
 
3. Quantitative tests 
 
We aim at estimating the impact of the 1893 and 1898 regulatory changes in various 
dimensions: first, the impact on the development of the market; second on the market’s 
quality. 
The regulatory changes of 1893 and 1898 cannot be separated, as should be clear from the 
historical presentation above, from other changes in the microstructures of the two markets, 
so that we can only measure the impact of these broad, global changes, on the market 
development. Two polar arguments can be made, following either the contemporaries 
favourable to the Coulisse or to the Parquet: for the first ones, the 1893 liberalization should 
help develop the whole market and increase the share of the Coulisse. It should also reduce 
the transaction costs thanks to improved competition. From the point of view of those 
favourable to the Parquet or to a hierarchy of markets, the 1893 move should have damaged 
the Parquet and improved the situation of the coulissiers because of their dual capacity as 
brokers and operators on their own account (without the obligations market makers have 
nowadays). This setting would not lead to a decrease in transaction costs for investors because 
the informational rents48 and inventory costs of coulissiers and the increased uncertainty for 
investors could compensate the positive impact of improved competition. The effects of the 
1898 move should be the opposite: for Coulisse supporters, it should not only have damaged 
the Coulisse but the market as a whole, and increased transaction costs. For Parquet 
supporters, it should have little affected the market as a whole and decreased transaction costs 
by reducing uncertainty and informational rents.  
These arguments could be valid only for some segments of the market, since the competitive 
advantages of both organizations differed. For example, it may be that the 1893 liberalization 
affected mostly some segments of the Parquet’s activity: foreign bonds and shares with large 
                                                 
47  For example, the world 1907 crisis which devastated the London Stock Exchange didn’t affect the Parisian 
exchanges  
48  The Coulissiers benefitted from two kinds of informational rents : on the one hand, they monitored better 
than operators the order flow ; on the other hand, they were mainly foreign operators maintaining strong links 
with correspondents in their home country, which gave them useful insights for international arbitrage.  
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volumes, particularly in the forward market, were taken over immediately by the Coulisse, 
when the Parquet resisted better on private (French) securities, both for the spot and forward 
operations. After the 1895 crisis, the Parquet may also have benefitted from a flight to quality, 
some investors and issuers looking again for the reputation and stability of a regulated market.  
 
Data 
Little data is available on the Coulisse before 1898 and on transactions in general before 
1893. It results precisely from the organization the new laws planned to modify: without a 
transaction tax, transactions were not registered, except within the Parquet, where the 
registration aimed at financing the central organization thanks to a contribution of each agent 
proportional to its transactions, but did not provide details on transactions by security in order 
not to affect competition among members. The list of the securities traded on the Parquet is 
precisely known thanks to the official listing procedures and publicity, but the very concept of 
listing did not exist for the Coulisse, each broker quoting prices for the securities he wanted, 
and newspapers publishing the lists of their choice. By contrast, an “official” list for the 
Coulisse was published from 1899 on (but not for the new “marché libre”). Only prices are 
reasonably well documented... as long as one picks them by hand in contemporary 
newspapers. This is easily done concerning the Parquet, which published an official and 
exhaustive daily price list. For the Coulisse, the Cote de la Banque et de la Bourse was, from 
1884 on, the prominent private list of the market, but included probably only part of the 
securities traded. 
 
Listings 
We constructed a list of securities which prices were published as “traded on the Coulisse”  in 
the Cote de la Banque et de la Bourse for July 1st, 1890, December 31st 1894, December 31st, 
1900 and December 31st, 1913 (table 1). It suggests that the regulatory changes had relatively 
little impact. The market share of the Parquet didn’t decrease after 1893: it actually rose on 
French securities, and decreased on foreign ones. Coulisse didn't suffer from1898 either: in 
1900, the market share of the Parquet had increased, compared to 1894, only for foreign 
bonds (certainly the most contested market), but decreased for French stocks. Moreover, the 
Coulisse’s list in 1900 included twice the number of securities that we counted for 1890.  
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Table 1 Market share of the Parquet in terms of number of securities listed (see annex 1). 
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Parquet French bonds Parquet french stocks Parquet foreign bonds Parquet foreign stocks
 
Source : our count, from the Cote officielle des valeurs cotées à la Bourse de Paris (Parquet) and the 
Cote de la Banque et de la Bourse (Coulisse). 
 
Nevertheless, it may be that the 1898 change is responsible for the decline of the Coulisse 
after 1900: the 12% decrease overall of the number of securities listed (almost 30% on foreign 
stocks) may well result from the growing interest of the Parquet for some segments (it more 
than doubled during that period the number of foreign stocks on its list), and from its legal 
capacity to exclude the Coulisse from them.  
 
Transactions 
The volumes of transactions are difficult to evaluate before the 1893 law. After that law, data 
on the payment of the tax provide some information. Nevertheless, the rates of the tax are 
lowered (by 75%) for the French rentes in 1895, and unfortunately the allocation of 
transactions between these rentes and other securities is unknown. This makes it difficult to 
compare the 1894-1895 years with the following ones. 
 
Table 2: rates of the tax on stock exchange transactions (in per thousand) 
Reports
Date
28/04/1893 0,05 0,05 0,025 0,025 0,1000
28/12/1895 0,0125 0,05 0,00625 0,025 0,1000
31/12/1907 0,0125 0,1000 0,00625 0,025 0,2000
15/07/1914 0,0125 0,1500 0,00625 0,0375 0,3000
Forward & spot 
transactions
French 
public bond
Other 
securities
French 
public bond
Other 
securities
Deals on 
foreign 
exchanges
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If we believe the estimation (provided by supporters of the Coulisse) of 75 billions francs of 
operations for the Coulisse in 1892 and 35 for the Parquet (then a 2.14 to 1 ratio), and 
compare it to the ratio of the tax paid by the two markets in 1894 (2.17 in favour of the 
Coulisse), the similarity is striking. It suggests that the Coulisse didn’t benefit much, at least 
in the short term, from its new freedom49. On the other hand, the same ratio for 1903 was only 
0.5. As graph 1 shows, the « market share » of the Coulisse dropped from 2/3d to 1/3d around 
the 1898 reform. In terms of timing, the Coulisse suffered a first drop in 1895, which may be 
attributed to the crash in the “gold mines” stocks.  
 
Graph 1 Market shares of the transaction tax paid by the Parquet and all other markets (in %) 
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Source : Bulletin de statistiques et de législations comparées 
 
                                                 
49  Both the 1892 and 1894 figures could overstate the size of the Coulisse since what they call « Coulisse » 
measures actually all operations not passed through the Parquet, which includes operations done by banks 
and by independent mini-markets like those organized by some financial newspapers. On the other hand, 
fiscal evasion works in the opposite direction. 
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Graph 2 Amount of transactions tax paid in Paris 
(millions francs)
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Sources : Bulletin de statistiques et de législations comparée; archives CAEF for internal documents 
of the Finance Ministry allowing the calculation of the “1896 estimated” point. 
 
Graph 2 gives the amount of the tax paid on stock exchange transactions from 1893 onwards 
by brokers located in Paris (they represented around 96% of all tax payments in France). The 
1896 drop results both from the “gold mines” crash of October 1895, and from the decrease in 
the tax rates. The point “1896 estimated” gives an estimate of the total tax that would have 
been paid in1896 had the tax rates remained the same. It suggests that around 60% of the 
decline resulted from the change in tax rates, the rest resulting from a decline in transactions. 
Most importantly, graph 2 shows that total transactions didn't decline after 1898, contrary to 
the predictions of the Coulisse supporters. They may even have increased. 
The internal stamp tax that the Parquet imposed to its members (in order to finance collective 
action and collective guarantee) provides us with more detailed information on the 
transactions on the Parquet50. If one considers more carefully the various segments of the 
market (see graphs in appendix 2), it is possible to note that the Parquet suffered no serious 
blow from the 1893 reform: even if its market share declined from mid-1894 up to the gold 
mines crash, it participated the boom of 1894-95 and the 1896 crisis, mostly on the forward 
market. The spot market wasn’t much affected by the 1898 regulation, which benefited 
mostly the forward market (which activity rose by 75% between 1898 and 1899. This 
increased activity was concentrated in foreign government debts (+60%) and, above all, 
private foreign securities (+150%). On the other hand, the decrease in the Parquet forward 
operations on the French rentes was not stopped, and the rise in its forward operations on 
                                                 
50  This information is registered in the Parquet archives, see Lagneau-Riva 2005 
  
 21
private French securities was not much affected by either the 1893 or the 1898 laws, maybe 
because it always had dominated that market segment, either (overwhelmingly) for spot or  
(relatively) for forward operations. 
These results suggest that neither the supporters of the Coulisse nor those of the Parquet were 
right: The Parquet didn’t suffer much from the 1893 law, mostly because the Coulisse had 
already conquered most of the market it could pretend to satisfy (banks, institutional investors 
and brokers issuing and dealing in securities not – yet – definitively distributed in individual 
portfolios). On the other hand, the supporters of the Coulisse were wrong in pretending that 
transferring the control of the market to the Parquet would result in an overall decline of the 
market: the change affected the distribution between Coulisse and Parquet but didn’t – 
apparently – stop the development of the market, which was rapid from 1898 to 1913.  
 
Transaction costs 
Commissions were usually lower on the Coulisse, at least for large transactions. The 
difference, nevertheless, was lower than argued by coulissiers, since they compared their 
commissions to the official maximum commissions set by the Parquet regulation rather than 
to the actual commissions, usually nearer from the minimum  (50% of the official maximum) 
that the Parquet tried to impose to its members (with frequent enforcement problems, as the 
CAC archives testify). Furthermore, the 1898 reform led to official maximum commissions 
being halved, which put the Parquet on a footing similar to the Coulisse.  
A major reason for the low commissions on the Coulisse is the fact its members acted also on 
their own account as counterparty, something forbidden to Parquet members. Part of their 
profits then resulted from the spread between their bid and ask prices. Unfortunately, these 
spreads have not been registered by the press, and – maybe in order to hide the dual capacity 
of the coulissiers to the private investors – the prices for securities listed on the Coulisse were 
always published as if they were pure “equilibrium” prices. We use the Roll (1984) model in 
order to derive implicit spreads, a measure of the liquidity cost, for both the Coulisse and the 
Parquet in 1892, 1894 and 1903. We chose these dates in order to observe the impact of the 
1893 change before the market boom and crash of 1895-6; then we chose 1903 as the last 
term of comparison because, as our narrative demonstrates, all the adjustments to the 1898 
law were not ended until 1902.  
One must consider that the Coulisse provided a higher immediacy, since on many securities 
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its members were willing to buy or sell at any moment, when, after the opening fixing, 
Parquet members, as pure brokers, had to wait for a colleague to post an opposite order during 
the continuous auction. Furthermore, the Parquet was open only two hours a day, when the 
Coulisse opened much longer hours. The important advantage of immediacy had a price, 
which the spread certainly measures to some extent.  
In a perfectly competitive and transparent market in which all agents have access to the same 
information, the spread must correspond only to their non-informational costs. An informed 
operator with dual capacity and no disclosure obligations can impose margins higher than 
these costs only in a situation of both opaqueness and asymmetric information. The Roll 
measure estimates realized spreads based on the covariance of past prices. His model makes 
strong hypotheses on the independence and random walk of past prices, and is more 
restrictive than more recent models (Glosten, 1987; Stoll, 1989; Roomans, 1993). 
Nevertheless, these models require more information (on volumes in particular) that are not 
available in our historical setting.  
 
We built portfolios corresponding to the various segments of the Paris stock market: not only 
the Parquet and the Coulisse, but their different sections, in order to compare properly average 
spreads. One methodological problem we faced is that, precisely because of the (changing) 
regulations, the Coulisse and the Parquet didn’t list entirely comparable securities. This is 
why we built quite diversified portfolios (see appendix 3), totalling respectively 51, 51 and 38 
securities for the Coulisse in 1892, 1894 and 1903, and 48, 50 and 47 for the Parquet (changes 
result from the availability of securities in some small segments at some dates). We focused 
particularly on cross-listed securities (those listed both on the Parquet and the Coulisse, 
something which supposedly should have not existed in 1892 and disappeared in 1903 but 
existed in both cases51). For these securities (which represent above a third of our total 
sample), any result will appear as particularly strong since no fixed effect of the security can 
explain differences between the markets and affect the results. Furthermore, in order to 
facilitate the comparison between years, we also included as frequently as possible the same 
securities in the portfolios of consecutive years. We were able to include at least 75% of 
identical securities, which also reinforce our results. 
                                                 
51  Nevertheless, illegal operations before 1892 and, after 1898, the publication of prices for transactions 
handled by the Coulissiers having established their headquarters in Brussels allow us to collect the prices of 
cross-listed securities for these years.   
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We collected weekly prices for these securities and calculated the spreads for each security 
(some spreads could not be calculated because the co-variances were positive); we averaged 
these spreads for various portfolios, built on a combination of the market were the securities 
were listed (Parquet, Coulisse, or both), the type of security (bonds or stocks), the nationality 
of the issuer (French or foreign), the type of operation (forward or spot). The spreads on the 
Parquet are regularly lower than the Coulisse’s ones, reflecting the differences in the trading 
systems. According to Pagano-Roell (1996), the transparent market run by pure brokers with 
starting fixing and continuous auction produces tighter spreads; the opaque market run by 
informed dual capacity operators gives higher spreads, reflecting the rents coulissiers could 
extract from their superior information in an opaque market.  
Despite the fact that all segments were not represented, the results of the diachronical analysis 
are quite clear (figure 2): in the Parisian market as a whole, spreads rose after 1893 (by 35% 
on average) and decline after 1898 (by 45%). The increase in the spread of the Coulisse was 
markedly higher than the one in the Parquet. This suggest that the 1893 move gave to 
coulissiers the opportunity to increase their spreads, thanks to their capacity to provide 
immediacy to a larger number of securities and their ability in using their private information 
in a more opaque market: in practice, the coulissiers were allowed to trade in all the securities 
without any juridical uncertainty. The increase in 1894 Coulisse’s spreads were markedly 
strong in the spot and forward prices of single listed French and foreign shares. For these 
segments, the lack of competition allowed the coulissiers to wider more their spreads than on 
cross-listed securities52. In 1898 by contrast, the re-regulation imposed a reduction in spreads, 
which was particularly strong in the Parquet, mainly thanks to the consolidation of the order 
flow in a transparent market53. 
If this hypothesis is true, spreads should be higher on average on the Coulisse, especially for 
cross-listed securities. This is clearly the case for most of our portfolios, but not true 
systematically (which may result from the small size of the portfolios).  
 
                                                 
52  On the other hand, the Couliss’s spreads on cross-listed foreign bonds did not change much, which is not 
surprising since they were already traded by the coulissiers in 1892 and remained submitted to the 
competition of the Parquet in 1894.  
53 Note that the increase in spreads should not result from the introduction of the tax, which was ultimately paid 
by the clients, not the intermediaries; in any case, the tax remained in place in 1903, when spreads fell. 
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Graph 3. Roll Spreads mesures for all securities category
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Legend :  The graph gives the average spreads of the various segments of the market, each one being 
identified by a combination of initials: Bi is for cross-listed (on both Parquet and Coulisse), Fi for 
fixed income securities; Va for stocks; T is for forward market; C is for spot market; Co is for 
Coulisse (only); Pa is for Parquet (only); Pu is for government bonds; Pr is for private securities; Et is 
for foreign and Fr for French. 
 
In order to test more strictly for this, we regressed the individual securities’ spreads on a set of 
dummy variables for the different characteristics all presented in the following model:  
 
 SPREAD= µ1 Year92+ µ2 Year94+ µ3 Type+ µ4 Market+ µ5 Country 
    + µ6 Private+ µ7 Crosslisted  
 
The results confirm our hypothesis (table 3): spreads are significantly higher in 1894 (and 
much higher: one average more than one percentage point higher, or 50% higher), and they 
are also significantly higher on the Coulisse (almost by the same amount). Furthermore, as 
one may find reassuring, they are higher for stocks than for bonds (also by a similar amount).  
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Dependent Variable: SPREAD
Included observations: 177
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t‐Statistic Prob.  
µ1 YEAR92 0.004677 0.004919 0.950865 0.3430
µ2 YEAR94 0.013156 0.004788 2.747706 0.0066 ***
µ3 TYPE 0.011917 0.005990 1.989434 0.0483 **
µ4 MARKET 0.009819 0.003921 2.504338 0.0132 **
µ5 COUNTRY ‐0.003900 0.004506 ‐0.865502 0.3880
µ6 PRIVATE ‐0.001218 0.006332 ‐0.192442 0.8476
µ7 CROSSLISTED 0.007497 0.004834 1.550852 0.1228
R‐squared 0.126543     Mean dependent var 0.020193
Adjusted R‐squared 0.095715     S.D. dependent var 0.027951
S.E. of regression 0.026580     Akaike info criterion ‐4.378599
Sum squared resid 0.120101     Schwarz criterion ‐4.252988
Log likelihood 394.5060     F‐statistic 4.104819
Durbin‐Watson stat 2.142975     Prob(F‐statistic) 0.000712
*,**,*** significant respectively at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Legend:
µ1 YEAR92 1892=1 other year=0
µ2 YEAR94 1894=1 other year=0
µ3 TYPE Stock=1, fixed income securitie=0 
µ4 MARKET Coulisse=1, Parquet=0
µ5 COUNTRY Foreign security=1, French=0
µ6 PRIVATE Corporate security=1, else=0
µ7 CROSSLISTED Mono‐listed security=1, cross‐listed=0
Table 3. Roll Spreads vs securities and markets (Parquet & Coulisse) characteristics  
 
 
Financial integration  
The next step in this work entails measuring the degree of integration of the two markets. For 
that purpose, we study the co-integration of various portfolios for the Parquet and the 
Coulisse and test for Granger causality between these series. This is necessary in order to 
understand better the relationship between the two markets. As Hasbrouck (1995) put it, a 
market might have large spreads and a relatively slow price-adjustment, but if innovations in 
this market cause reactions in another market where spreads are smaller and adjustment more 
rapid, the first market can still be understood as informationally dominant. In our case, this 
would may suggest that the Coulisse may be the most efficient (informationally) despite 
having larger spreads.  
We built portfolios for six segments of the market, and price indices for each portfolio; we 
  
 26
calculated returns for these portfolios. Unit roots tests on the indices (in logs) showed that all 
indices were non-stationary and first order integrated. This allowed us to test for co-
integration using the Engle-Granger (1987) test. Results are given in table 4. Unsurprisingly, 
cointegration is more frequent for cross-listed securities, since the same securities appear in 
both markets so that direct arbitrage is possible. It is also higher for securities traded on the 
more active forward market.  
In order to apprehend whether one of the markets is dominant and influences the other, we 
tested for Granger (1969) causality using the returns on our indices.  Results are reported in 
table 5. They are consistent with table 4 in that causality mostly appears for cross-listed 
securities and those traded on the forward market. Causality runs always from the Coulisse to 
the Parquet, suggesting the Coulisse was actually the market where information was gathered 
first, and then diffused towards the Parquet. There is one exception : the spot market for 
stocks, where, at least for cross-listed stocks in 1894, causality runs from the Parquet to the 
Coulisse; this is actually not surprising as the Parquet was well known by contemporaries as 
being the dominant market for most (at least French) stocks.  
Both cointegration and causality are more frequent in 1894 compared to 1892 (most tests have 
higher values), which suggests that the 1893 deregulation had a positive impact on the 
efficiency of the market. Nevertheless, the level in 1903 is not much below that in 1894, 
suggesting the 1898 reform didn't have consequences symmetric to the 1893 change.  
 
Portfolios
1892 1894 1903
Cross‐listed, fixed income, forward market ‐1,56 ‐5,65 *** ‐4,04 ***
Cross‐listed, stocks, forward market ‐7,51 *** ‐6,8 *** ‐6,61 ***
Cross‐listed, stocks, spot market ‐1,96 ‐2,78 * ‐2,49
Mono‐listed, stocks, forward market ‐1,43 ‐2,32 ‐5,37 ***
Mono‐listed, fixed income, spot market ‐2,62 * ‐2,12 ‐1,4
Mono‐listed, stocks, spot market ‐0,93 ‐2,28 ‐1,05
Table 4. Tests for cointegration of portfolio indices between Parquet 
and Coulisse
Engel‐Granger (ADF)
*,**,*** s igni fi cant at 10% (‐2,58), 5% (‐2,89) or 1% (‐3,51).   
The table provides the tests for cointegration (H0: absence of cointegration) between indices of two 
portfolios of securities in the same market segment traded on the Parquet and the Parquet. 
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1892 1894 1903
Parquet to Coulisse 0,66 0,70 0,38
Coulisse to Parquet 0,53 0,08 * 0,07 *
Parquet to Coulisse 0,21 0,79 0,73
Coulisse to Parquet 0,99 0,00 *** 0,91
Parquet to Coulisse 0,97 0,00 *** 0,57
Coulisse to Parquet 0,30 0,19 0,36
Parquet to Coulisse 0,16 0,20 0,20
Coulisse to Parquet 0,30 0,04 ** 0,02 **
Parquet to Coulisse 0,47 0,62 0,62
Coulisse to Parquet 0,07 * 0,53 0,72
Parquet to Coulisse 0,59 0,75 0,65
Coulisse to Parquet 0,41 0,61 0,36
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Mono‐listed, stocks, forward market
Mono‐listed, fixed income, spot market
Mono‐listed, stocks, spot market
                  Tableau 5. Granger‐causality tests between portfolios of the Coulisse and the 
Parquet, by year (p‐value)
Granger causality from
Crossi‐listed, fixed income, forward market
Cross‐listed, stocks, forward market
Cross‐listed, stocks, spot market
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Our analysis of the 1893 and 1898 regulatory changes suggests that the reforms had 
unexpected consequences for all the actors involved. The 1893 reform likely improved the 
efficiency of the market as a whole and reinforced the primacy of the Coulisse as the 
dominant market (in terms of returns' causality), a primacy that resulted less from its 
institutional position than from its large market share in transactions. Nevertheless, it is not 
clear whether the 1893 reform would have facilitated a long term development of the market: 
in the short term, it probably contributed to the speculative bubble on the gold mines which 
ended with the 1895 crash; after that episode, transactions stagnated until the 1898 reform. 
Furthermore, the 1893 reform imposed substantial costs on investors: it allowed the Coulisse 
to enlarge its spreads, increasing transaction costs. By contrast, the 1898 reform look like 
mostly beneficial: transaction costs declined substantially thanks both to price controls on the 
Parquet (to a small extent) and (mostly) from the lower spreads on the now dominant 
transparent market. Immediacy was still available on the Coulisse for a number of securities, 
but most investors exchanged some immediacy for lower costs. Most importantly, the 1898 
reform didn't provoke a decline in the market as a whole, which continued growing up to 
World War One. It may also have contributed to stabilizing it: the Paris Bourse escaped the 
1907 crisis. The analysis of this episode then reinforces the literature emphasizing the 
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capacity of dual market organizations in providing efficient services to the users of stock 
exchanges.  
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Appendix 1 Securities listed on the Parquet and the Coulisse 
Parquet 
  1890 1894 1900 1913 
French and colonial securities 1-VII 31-XII 31-XII 31-XII 
   Théry  us  us  us 
Government bonds  6  8  11  27 
Regional governments bonds  35  5  8  9 
Local governments bonds  19  40  38  37 
Railroads bonds  92  74  82  100 
Transportation bonds     40  17  21 
Other bonds  68  72  110  143 
Total French bonds  220  239  266  337 
              
Railroads stocks  37  27  40  39 
Finance stocks  53  43  41  58 
Insurance stocks  47  33  32  37 
Various stocks  167  101  143  239 
Canals and transport stocks     32  30  51 
Total French stocks  304  236  286  424 
              
Parquet : total number of French securities 524  475  552  761 
   us  us  us  us 
Foreign securities            
Government bonds  91  114  141  167 
Regional governments bonds  5  7  3  6 
Local governments bonds  1        3 
Railroads bonds  33  36  38  77 
Other bonds  8  16  21  50 
Total foreign bonds  138  173  203  303 
              
Railroads stocks  15  12  17  20 
Finance stocks  18  11  13  43 
Insurance stocks     1  2  2 
Various stocks  7  13  28  64 
Total foreign stocks  40  37  60  129 
              
Parquet : total number of foreign securities 178  210  263  432 
           
Parquet : total number of listed securities 702  685  815  1193 
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Coulisse 
  1890 1894 1900 1913 
  1-VII 31-XII 31‐XII  31‐XII 
French and colonial securities         
Government bonds     2       
Regional governments bonds  1  2  1    
Local governments bonds  3          
Railroads bonds  1  1  3    
Transportation bonds  6  1  4    
Other private bonds  26  17  32    
Total number of French bonds  37  23  40  0 
              
Railroads stocks  1  1  2    
Finance and insurance stocks  1  4  14  17 
Transportation stocks  3  9  18  25 
Other  stocks  55  36  129  134 
Total number of french stocks  60  50  163  176 
              
Coulisse : total number of French 
securities 97  73  203  176 
              
Foreign securities            
Government bonds  13  25  17  42 
Regional governments bonds    4   8 
Local governments bonds  17  20  17  38 
Railroads bonds  23  24  15    
Various private bonds  7  24  16    
Total number of foreign bonds  60  97  65  88 
              
Transportation stocks  4  4  2  16 
Finance and insurance stocks  9  6  5  8 
Various stocks  39  65  121  58 
Total number of foreign stocks  52  75  128  82 
Coulisse : total number of foreign 
securities 112  172  193  170 
              
Coulisse: total number of  securities 209  245  396  346 
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Appendix 2. Transactions on the Parquet, 1890-1913 (from the stamp internal tax of the 
Parquet) 
 
Parquet: number of spot contracts 
(millions)
-
1
2
3
4
 
Parquet: value of spot contracts (billions fr)
-
1,00
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Parquet: forward market, value of 
delivered securities  (billions fr.)
-
1,00
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Parquet: forward market, number of 
delivered corporate securities (millions)
-
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Parquet: forward market, value of 
delivered public bonds 
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Appendix 3 : details on the spreads by segment for the Parquet and the Coulisse 
This table provides information on the number of securities in each portfolio, on the spreads available 
(by construction, the spread is unavailable when the covariance in the security prices is positive), and 
the average spread used for graph 2. 
Average spread
1892 1894 1903 1892 1894 1903 1892 1894 1903
Bi-listed securities
Fixed income, forward market 6 6 5 2 4 2 0,02 0,01 0,03
Foreign Government 6 6 5 2 4 2 0,02 0,01 0,03
Stocks, forward market 1 2 1 na na na na na na
Foreign 1 2 1 na na na na na na
Stocks, spot market 9 9 2 5 6 2 0,01 0,05 0,03
French Corporate 9 9 2 5 6 2 0,01 0,05 0,03
Securities listed only on the Coulisse
Fixed income, sport market 11 11 10 11 11 7 0,02 0,02 0,01
Foreign 11 11 10 11 11 7 0,02 0,02 0,01
government 6 6 5 6 6 4 0,02 0,02 0,01
Corporate 5 5 6 5 5 3 0,02 0,02 0,01
Stocks, spot market 11 11 10 7 9 5 0,02 0,04 0,03
French Corporate 6 6 5 3 5 2 0,02 0,04 0,05
Foreign Corporate 5 5 5 4 4 3 0,02 0,04 0,01
Stocks, forward market 7 6 5 6 5 2 0,02 0,07 0,01
Foreign Corporate 7 6 5 6 5 2 0,02 0,07 0,01
Parquet
Average of the spreads
1892 1894 1903 1892 1894 1903 1892 1894 1903
Bi-listed securities
Fixed income, forward market 7 7 8 4 2 5 0,02 0,01 0,01
French Government 1 1 1 1 na na 0 na na
Foreign Government 6 6 7 3 2 5 0,02 0,01 0,01
Stocks, forward market 1 3 4 1 2 3 0,03 0,01 0,01
Foreign Corporate 1 3 4 1 2 3 0,03 0,01 0,01
Stocks, spot market 9 9 5 5 5 3 0,02 0,01 0,01
French Corporate 9 9 5 5 5 3 0,02 0,01 0,01
Securities listed only on the Parquet
Fixed income, spot market 12 12 12 10 10 10 0,01 0,01 0,01
Foreign 12 12 12 10 10 10 0,01 0,01 0,01
Government 6 6 6 5 4 6 0,01 0,01 0,01
Corporate 6 6 6 5 6 4 0,01 0,02 0,01
Stocks, spot market 12 12 11 8 7 5 0,02 0,05 0,01
French Corporate 7 7 7 3 4 4 0,02 0,07 0,01
Foreign Corporate 5 5 4 5 3 1 0,02 0,02 0,02
Stocks, forward market 7 7 7 5 6 4 0,02 0,02 0,01
Foreign Corporate 7 7 7 5 6 4 0,02 0,02 0,01
Coulisse                                        
Number of securities 
per category
Number of spreads 
available
Number of securities 
per category
Number of spreads 
available
